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Recent explorations of the territory between epistemology and ethics 
identify a distinctively epistemic form of injustice through which an individual 
can be harmed in their capacity as a knower. Starting with Miranda Fricker’s 
important account, the growing literature on epistemic injustice has broadened 
our understanding of this capacity to include an individual’s participation in 
epistemic practices of questioning, justification, communication, and evaluation 
of truth. Theorists challenge Fricker’s account of prejudicial identity bias as the 
source of harm of epistemic injustice. An overarching goal for this paper is to 
provide a framework for ethical analysis of epistemic injustice that accounts for a 
broader conception of such epistemic harms. In particular, when scaling up our 
analysis of epistemic injustice from the level of individual transactions to the 
systemic level, monitoring identity prejudice fails to account for the bad 
cumulative effects that can result from a series of epistemically just interactions. 
The work of this paper begins with showing that such a narrow conception of 
bias in epistemic injustice obscures our ability to properly situate just epistemic 
practices within a normative framework. I introduce the notion of epistemic labor 
to account for the complex management of bias and argue that Fricker’s concept 
of innocent epistemic negligence, an intuition that one may not be blameworthy 
for certain instances of credibility downgrading, leads to a displacement of a 
shared responsibility to ensure an epistemically just interaction. I identify the 
source of harm of epistemic injustice as the unequal burden of this labor and 
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argue that institutional approaches to alleviate epistemic injustice are necessary. 
Finally, tracking epistemic labor given a shared and pervasive risk of bias is 
essential in the assessment of epistemically just practices. I propose epistemic 
labor accountability as a framework to assess instances of epistemic injustice and 
use it to evaluate a dilemma in bioethics: disclosure requirements in the clinical 
encounter. 
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 “The point I wish to make, however, can be introduced by calling to mind 
the fact that classificatory schemes, however theoretical their purpose, have 
practical consequences: nominal causes, so to speak, have real effects”- 




A primary aim for bioethics is to make explicit and clarify the value 
judgments that are implicit in public health and medical practice that are not 
ethically neutral. While this work is integral to decision making generally, it is 
especially relevant when the aim of deliberation is to come to a shared 
understanding amid conflicting biases and values. Further, given that bioethics 
assesses practices and policies relevant to human health, it involves weighing 
principles and values of health as well-being along with objective scientific 
evidence. Thus, a method for integrating ethics into decision making processes 
such as priority setting for health investments, or discussions of risks and 
benefits prior of treatment in a clinical encounter, depends on participants’ 
ability to correctly attribute epistemic merit and willingness to consider certain 
values as evidence. The goal of this analysis is to show how our understanding 
of epistemic injustice can serve to guide such ethical deliberations in public 
health and medicine. 
 
In her book, “Epistemic Injustice: The Power and the Ethics of Knowing,” 
Miranda Fricker presents a distinctly epistemic form of injustice in which a 
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person is wronged “specifically in her capacity as a knower” (Fricker). In 
Fricker’s path breaking account, instances of injustice occur when a hearer 
unjustly downgrades a speaker’s credibility, or degrades them qua knower. She 
demarcates two forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice involves one’s 
epistemic authority and occurs from unjust downgrading of one’s credibility, 
and hermeneutical injustice occurs when one lacks the necessary epistemic 
resources to make sense of one’s experiences.  In other words, a speaker's 
standing as a knower, reasoner, or questioner is vulnerable to epistemic injustice 
when one’s trustworthiness to provide information via testimony, or capacity to 
engage in epistemic practices to interpret their experiences, is wrongly 
undermined. 
 
Since its introduction several theorists have critiqued Fricker’s account for 
construing the harm of epistemic injustice as primarily contingent on instances of 
identity prejudice1. In particular, attempts to account for the complexity of 
epistemic injustice at a structural or systemic level while maintaining the locus of 
harm at the level of individual interactions, suggest that this view is too narrow. 
While the need to be vigilant of identity prejudice when assessing credibility at 
the individual level is clear, factors arise at the systemic level that also influence 
an appropriate judgment of credibility. Importantly, since this move is 
                                                     




characterized by the significant difficulty of tracking bias, it risks tacitly 
justifying an individual’s intuition that one may not be blameworthy for certain 
instances of credibility downgrading. According to Fricker the intuition results 
from human fallibility, a mistake of innocent epistemic negligence, or mere 
epistemic bad luck. 
 
While we may admit to the intuition of a blameless wrong act, in the case of 
epistemic negligence it is not clear what exactly is being excused as blameless. In 
this thesis, I will argue that this view fails to acknowledge a pervasive risk of bias 
in human cognition and clouds efforts to track the cumulative effects of 
epistemic injustice. Finally, I introduce epistemic labor to account for the complex 
management of bias in our epistemic practices and propose a framework for 
evaluating the risk of epistemic injustice. This argument will proceed in the 
following way: 
1. First, I present Fricker’s foundational account of epistemic injustice and 
innocent epistemic negligence. 
 
2. In order to sketch the explanatory gap that an appropriate account of the 
source of harm must address, I draw from Elizabeth Anderson’s criticism 
that scaling up the object of our normative assessment from a 
transactional level to the structural level reveals that bad cumulative 
effects can result from a series of just interactions. I argue that Anderson’s 
proposal for integration as a solution is insufficient to address the problem 
she highlights. 
 
3. Third, stemming from contrasting critiques between Anderson’s 
distributive justice approach and José Medina’s proportional equality I 
aim to clarify in what the object of equality for epistemic injustice consists. 
Answering this question reveals a distinction between credibility as 
4 
 
epistemic merit and the resources required to attribute credibility to 
another. I introduce the concept of epistemic labor to account for the 
complexity of controlling biases underlying our epistemic practices and 
propose that while we do not seek equal distribution of credibility as a 
good, we seek equal epistemic labor as a way of reaching that good.  
 
4. In this section, I argue that innocent epistemic negligence leads to a 
displacement of the responsibility to engage in equal epistemic labor. 
While the separation of blame and wrongdoing when faced with the 
difficulty of tracking epistemic labor is tempting, I offer various ways in 
which this separation risks insidious epistemic injustice. 
 
5. I propose epistemic labor accountability as a framework for properly 
situating just epistemic practices within a normative framework. I show 
that the need for such assessment is especially salient in tracking epistemic 
labor in meaning making processes, such as shared decision-making or 
the production and distribution of epistemic resources. 
 
6. I offer a case study that exemplifies the value of epistemic labor 
accountability in assessing instances of epistemic injustice in healthcare. 
Evaluating epistemic labor accountability gives rise to certain 
responsibilities both at an individual level as well as the institutional level 
for disclosure requirements in the clinical encounter. 
 
Broadening our understanding of the harm of epistemic injustice allows for a 
comprehensive evaluation of efforts to avoid or engage in epistemic labor, the 
balancing of value judgments to reach an appropriate attribution of epistemic 
merit and epistemic authority. This framework thus serves as a lens through 
which a discussion of values is relevant and mutually informing for the 
discussion of facts. Finally, focusing on the obligations of epistemic labor 
accountability at a systemic level is more effective at tackling the broader 





I. Epistemic Injustice and Innocent epistemic negligence 
 
Fricker’s seminal account identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice: 
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. While testimonial injustice 
occurs when a speaker’s credibility is downgraded as a result of an individual 
hearer’s prejudice, hermeneutical injustice addresses the collective, or 
population, level. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when “a gap in collective 
interpretive resources puts someone at a disadvantage when it comes to making 
sense of their social experiences” (Fricker, p.1). Fricker’s aim is to shift our ethical 
lens to everyday epistemic practices in which we impart knowledge to others by 
telling, and make sense of our own social experiences. Drawing from feminist 
standpoint theory, Fricker’s theory of epistemic injustice understands epistemic 
practices as socially-situated. For her, epistemic agents are not “conceived in 
abstraction from relations of social power” (Fricker, p.2). While Fricker’s 
illustration of hermeneutical injustice is structural because the hearer is part of an 
epistemic community that lacks the interpretative resources to be held 
accountable for misunderstanding the speaker, she holds that the injustice can be 
traced back to an initial instance of identity prejudice. While she recognizes that 
structural injustices result in power imbalances, all epistemic injustice is 
reducible to a function of identity bias at the level of the individual. Thus, social 




Additionally, Fricker argues that forms of credibility deficit that are not based 
on such instances of identity prejudice are non-culpable because they are 
necessarily the result of innocent error, and thus do not constitute an injustice. 
She distinguishes these unlucky epistemic mistakes from instances of moral vice 
that cause injustice to a speaker. According to Fricker, a non-culpable false belief 
is one that does not occur as a result of prejudice or epistemic carelessness, and 
notes that instances of innocent epistemic error are inescapable due to fallible 
human judgment. Thus, credibility deficit is an injustice to the speaker only if it 
results from the harm of prejudicial moral vice (Fricker, p.21). 
 
The example for hermeneutical injustice presented by Fricker focuses on the 
concept of sexual harassment before the term was widely recognized as an 
epistemic resource and used in society to point to instances of sexual misconduct 
towards women. However, Fricker contends that in instances prior to the 
recognition of “sexual harassment” both hearer and speaker were subject to a 
hermeneutical lacuna because neither of them properly understood how women 
experienced sexual harassment. She further recognizes that the disadvantages of 
hermeneutical injustice in this case are clearly more serious for the woman since 
there is an “obvious sense in which it suits [the man’s] purpose”. In a 
parenthetical explanation to this distinction Fricker adds, 
Or at least it suits his purpose in that it leaves his conduct 
unchallenged. This is not to deny that if he is a decent person 
underneath, so that a better understanding of the seriousness of his 
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bad behavior would have led him to refrain, then the 
hermeneutical lacuna is for him a source of epistemic and moral 
bad luck (Fricker, p151). 
 
Additionally, she refrains from identifying as hermeneutical injustice instances in 
which patients that suffer medical disorders that have not yet been recognized by 
the medical community. Such instances represent merely “circumstantial epistemic 
bad luck” (Fricker, p152). 
 
The concept of innocent epistemic negligence, or moral bad luck, is used by 
Fricker to describe certain instances in which a hearer may downgrade the 
credibility of the speaker without it stemming from moral vice. In other words, 
the speaker experiences a credibility deficit that does not constitute an epistemic 
injustice because the hearer is not acting out of prejudice. Fricker notes that while 
in such a case the hearer was “not culpably at fault until they were in a position 
to know better,” and determining this point is best construed in degrees, the 
move from blameless to blameworthy occurs within a period of historical 
transition. Such a historical transition is marked by a “relevant advance in 
collective consciousness is needed to render the shortcoming in his epistemic 
conduct blameworthy” for epistemic injustice (Fricker, pg.100).  The reasons put 
forth for the non-culpable nature of this negligence center around the seeming 
impracticality of expecting constant vigilance, and of the difficulty of checking 
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one’s cognitive biases as a result of their interdependence on collective epistemic 
resources. 
 
II. What is lost in the move from transactional to structural epistemic 
injustice? 
 
Attempting to assess or measure how the effects of transactional relations 
affect relations at the societal level is very difficult to do. Theories of distributive 
justice, as Anderson points out, assign different criteria for evaluation to 
transactional and structural relations (Anderson).  Transactional theories, such as 
libertarianism, pose criteria that aim for just interactions between two 
individuals and usually apply to a single transaction in isolation (locally). On the 
other hand, structural theories exemplified by John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 
pose criteria with the aim to control the cumulative effect of individual 
transactions by evaluating a system’s global properties and imposing constraints 
on permissible rules (Anderson). However, in addressing the “bad cumulative 
effects of a series of just transactions,” transactional theories fall short as 
The individual practice of virtue is not up to the task of coping with 
the problems generated by a system of rules that regulate only the 
local properties of transactions and not their global effects. It is 
hard for individuals to acquire knowledge of who is most 
disadvantaged by the system, and very difficult for them to 
coordinate their helping efforts to maximum effect. Help will 
therefore tend to be maldistributed, being heaped on salient, highly 
publicized cases of episodic catastrophe while neglecting more 
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pervasive, persistent, and entrenched sources of disadvantage 
(Anderson, p.164). 
 
Expecting individuals alone to effect good cumulative effects by maintaining 
constant vigilance of their transactions seems to be an unreasonable burden. 
Anderson draws an important parallel between the properties of distributive 
theories of justice and epistemic justice, 
Answering a complex question, or interpreting some significant 
phenomenon, typically requires that we elicit epistemic 
contributions from numerous individuals and connect them 
appropriately. The cumulative effects of how our epistemic system 
elicits, evaluates, and connects countless individual communicative 
acts can be unjust, even if no injustice has been committed in any 
particular epistemic transaction (Anderson, p.165). 
 
Thus, just as we cannot expect that individual just transactions necessarily ensure 
good cumulative effects, imposing the task of epistemic justice at the individual 
level is too heavy a burden to control the global effects of epistemic injustice2. 
Anderson’s parallel reveals the need for a structural intervention to control the 
bad cumulative effects that even just transactions may perpetuate. This point is 
crucial to being able to see how our conceptions of the relationship between 
transactional and structural instances of injustice may prevent us from properly 
addressing the problem. In other words, part of the reason that we cannot expect 
correcting individual instances of transactional injustice to be a solution is that as 
                                                     
2 The claim that a good cumulative effect is just the result of individual transactions is what libertarian 
views hold. Just as it is open to one to be a distributive libertarian, it is open to one to be an ‘epistemic’ 
libertarian, whether because just transactions would ensure just global effects or because justice is only 
operative at the level of individual transactions. 
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individuals we are not well equipped to make sense of how these instances 
translate into the cumulative bad effect. We have two ways of dealing with this 
challenge. First, we can concede that it is futile to attribute a normative 
component to this process because we live in an imperfect world. Alas, according 
to Fricker, human judgment is fallible. Or second, we can determine what would 
be required to better equip individuals, as well as institutions, to make sense of 
the phenomenon. 
 
More importantly, because epistemic injustice concerns the discovery, 
circulation, and uptake of knowledge, it inherently affects an individual’s 
attempt at discerning which structural factors to consider in evaluating a 
speaker’s credibility. In Fricker’s view, while innocent epistemic negligence 
explains that a hearer is blameless without a shift in collective consciousness, it is 
unclear how such a shift would come about in the context of structural injustices. 
 
Anderson holds that simply asking individuals to check their identity 
prejudice would be insufficient to combat the harms of epistemic injustice at a 
structural level. Since facing massive structural epistemic injustice demands 
structural remedies, Anderson argues for a reconfiguration of epistemic 
practices. She goes on to propose integration and diversity at the institutional 
level as a partial solution. Building on Anderson’s valuable contribution to 
understanding the limitations of an individual virtue-based solution to epistemic 
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injustice, I seek to show what is missing from solutions that focus on integrating 
a diversity of views within an institution as structural remedies for epistemic 
justice.  
 
III. Equality of what? 
 
While Anderson’s analysis stems from a theory of distributive justice and 
aims for the fair distribution of credibility as a good, both Fricker and Medina 
identify a different view of fairness. In particular, the value that guides epistemic 
injustice is not equal distribution but proportionality. A proportional model of 
epistemic justice aims to ensure that attributions of epistemic authority are 
proportionate to their epistemic merit, including epistemic capacities and assets.  
We have to aspire to making our credibility judgments as 
proportionate to epistemic deserts and credentials as possible, 
avoiding disproportions that reflect and are grounded in (positive 
and negative) prejudices that involve the differential treatments of 
members of different groups. (Medina, p.22) 
 
Thus, the harm of epistemic injustice is not the result of unequal distribution but 
of “disproportion”. Central to Medina’s proportional account is the view that 
credibility excess, wrongly attributing greater epistemic merit, is just as harmful 
as credibility deficit. In his view, credibility judgments never apply to 
individuals in isolation from others, but affects groups of subjects. Therefore, 
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bestowing unwarranted epistemic trust and authority to one group results in a 
deficit for another (Medina).  
 
While both models provide valuable insight, examining the different 
conceptions of credibility begins to clarify important features of the source of 
harm of epistemic injustice. First, an appropriate attribution of epistemic 
authority, in a way that is proportionate to epistemic merit, is necessary for 
epistemically just interactions. It would be unreasonable to propose that 
credibility as epistemic authority ought to be redistributed by equal shares as a 
matter of fairness. There are many ways in which unequal epistemic authority is 
essential to our daily life, such as the greater credibility that is attributed 
surgeons, electricians, or teachers among others. On the other hand, by 
construing epistemic justice or credibility as a scarce good, Anderson seeks fair 
distribution of the markers of credibility for a given judgment under assessment. 
For example, education or the use of standardized grammar are relevant for 
decisions that require an educated decision. She distinguishes between the 
markers of credibility that are used for prejudicial compared to legitimate uses, 
writing:  
In societies that systematically deprive disadvantaged groups 
access to a decent education, the use of such markers in assessing 
credibility will tend to exclude those groups from further 
participation in inquiry. An original structural injustice—denial of 
fair opportunities for education—generates additional structural 
inequalities for exercising full epistemic agency, which is an 




Thus, in the distributive model of fairness the emphasis is on the equal 
distribution of access to markers of trustworthiness. While the view aims to 
ensure that disadvantaged groups have equal opportunity to acquire markers of 
credibility, it is limited to legitimate uses of credibility markers. Additionally, 
even though we often rely on markers of credibility to evaluate epistemic merit, 
it seems plausible to assess credibility without such markers. In other words, the 
use of markers of trustworthiness rightly captures the influence of structural 
injustices on individuals’ capacity to participate fully in epistemic practices. This 
reflects the need for an account of fairness that recognizes that some groups of 
knowers will be more susceptible to epistemic injustice. I argue that while it is 
necessary to account for the structural injustices that disadvantage an agent’s 
epistemic standing, shifting our focus on how such credibility markers are used 
will allow us to isolate the dimension of epistemic injustice that can be addressed 
even in a context of systemic oppression.  
 
According to Anderson, legitimate use of credibility markers is determined 
by the absence of prejudicial bias and allows for participation in social inquiry on 
terms of equality with others. She identifies the segregation of groups that results 
from inequality as what transforms otherwise innocent biases into instances of 
epistemic injustice. Thus, proposing group integration to ensure equal access to 
markers of credibility aims to enable disadvantaged groups to “gain epistemic 
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favor in the eyes of the privileged” (Anderson, p.171). While group integration in 
shared inquiry offers a valuable approach to include diverse viewpoints and 
identities in the production of epistemic resources, it fails to address the way in 
which, in the absence of structural justice, once group integration on the basis of 
social identity is achieved, other groups will remain disproportionately 
susceptible to epistemic injustice. Even though group integration is a necessary 
step towards remedying epistemic injustice, it still relies on the disadvantaged 
individuals to correct for biases that may be outside their capacity to 
comprehend.  
 
Returning to Medina’s proportional view of credibility, mere group 
integration as a remedy for structural epistemic injustice would seem to wrongly 
assume that the correcting for credibility deficit also corrects for a credibility 
excess that is also characteristic within systems of structural injustice. It is not a 
matter of bringing up the disadvantaged to the “epistemic favor” of the 
privileged but in committing to interdependence in epistemic inquiry, or 
assessment of epistemic merit. In other words, because structural injustice does 
not excuse the attribution of credibility excess, recognizing interdependence in 
seeking epistemically just interactions requires that this excess is checked, even 
for groups in a dominant position. Additionally, as Anderson recognizes, bias is 
difficult to control even after we have been made aware of it. This is 
demonstrated as an inability to control for implicit biases even in the face of 
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evidence that one is biased, such as studies on the association of negative 
stereotypes with certain racial identities. This point is supported in the literature 
stemming from feminist philosophy of science, showing that even when 
individuals are aware of their biases they are consistently ineffective at 
preventing unbiased judgments (Yap). Analogously, establishing racial 
integration does not guarantee that internalized forms of credibility deficit are 
not perpetuated. Further, or error, the risk of bias as an error in our epistemic 
practices is embedded throughout our decision-making process, and not solely in 
assessments of credibility. Moreover, as the distinction between hermeneutic and 
testimonial injustice blurs, it becomes increasingly difficult to track these biases.  
 
I propose an alternative approach by reconciling the proportional and 
distributive views. In an aim to maintain credibility as an attribution of epistemic 
authority that is proportional to epistemic merit, and recognizing the need to 
account for the disproportionate vulnerability to epistemic injustice that results 
from structural inequalities, I suggest that what we seek is equal investment in 
the complex management of bias. 
 
IV. Epistemic labor 
 
While we do not seek equal distribution of credibility as a good, we seek 
equal epistemic labor as a way of reaching justifiable levels of credibility. I 
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propose the concept of epistemic labor as the epistemic processes we undertake 
to manage biases. The previous section outlined some of the characteristics that 
make cognitive biases very difficult to control independently even by well-
intentioned agents. Epistemic labor, however, does not reduce to the effort of 
checking one’s bias since it aims to combat epistemic injustice more broadly. 
Since the primary goal of epistemic labor is epistemic justice, the appropriate 
attribution of epistemic authority requires considerations of epistemic merit but 
also addressing inequalities in epistemic standing.  The processes of epistemic 
labor begin with recognizing an interdependence in our understanding of the 
world, recognizing that contributing to epistemically just systems is a shared 
task. It includes; managing one’s individual bias, in particular, awareness of the 
ways in which we may benefit from a particular credibility deficit or excess, 
actively seeking, developing and using epistemic resources, and adjusting for the 
increased epistemic vulnerability of some knowers. This effort is burdensome. 
Attempts to reflect and correct for biases with vigilance or by seeking epistemic 
resources is cognitively taxing, and consumes both time and energy. In addition, 
certain situations, such a hospital emergency room, that require quick 
judgments, pose an additional burden to the work of epistemic labor.  
 
Controlling for an unequal burden of epistemic labor also serves to explain 
the harm of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. For example, this is evident 
in Fricker’s primary example of Tom Robinson’s trial in To Kill a Mocking bird, 
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The trial proceedings enact what is in one sense a straightforward 
struggle between the power of evidence and the power of racial 
prejudice, with the all-white jury’s judgment ultimately 
succumbing to the latter. But the psychology is subtle, and there is 
a great complexity of social meanings at work in determining the 
jury’s perception of Tom Robinson as a speaker. In a showdown 
between the word of a black man and that of a poor white girl … 
Telling the truth here is a minefield for Tom Robinson, since if he 
casts aspersions on the white girl, he will be perceived as a 
presumptuous, lying Negro; yet, if he does not publicize Mayella 
Ewell’s attempt to kiss him (which is what really happened), then a 
guilty verdict is even more nearly assured (Fricker, p.23). 
 
The harm of epistemic injustice is not merely the result of the jury’s identity 
prejudice down grading Tom Robinson’s credibility but that he carried the 
entirety of the burden to ensure an epistemically just interaction. While Fricker’s 
account identifies the role of power imbalance as central to epistemic injustice, I 
suggest that epistemic labor is a step in the direction of understanding how such 
power imbalances function in our epistemic practices.  
 
Moreover, although testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can be 
conceptually distinguished, they are intimately connected and often interact in 
various ways. Blurring the lines between the two also shows how an account of 
epistemic labor allows for a more comprehensive evaluation of epistemic 
injustice. An account provided by Charles Mills from his work on ignorance uses 




Applying these concepts [of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice] to 
racial domination, we could say that white ignorance is achieved and 
perpetuated through both varieties working in tandem: a general 
scepticism about non-white cognition and an exclusion from accepted 
discourse of non-white categories and frameworks of analysis. Thus, a 
double handicap will result—people of color will be denied credibility 
and the alternative viewpoints that could be developed from taking their 
perspective seriously will be rejected (Mills, p.222). 
 
In addition to emphasizing that the two types of epistemic injustice are 
intimately connected, the causal nature of the relation suggests systemic 
instances of testimonial injustice are reproduced as hermeneutical injustice. In 
other words, the harm of testimonial injustice is recapitulated in that the speaker 
is automatically hermeneutically marginalized. Similarly, Medina argues that 
conditions that produce and maintain ‘active ignorance’ reveal that 
hermeneutical and testimonial justice are inextricable from each other. This is the 
case as the conditions that shape individuals’ capacities for interpretation and 
understanding, also shape their capacity to properly assign levels of credibility 
and epistemic authority. Thus, Medina concludes, “there cannot be testimonial 
justice without hermeneutical justice” (Medina, p.26).  
 
V. Blameworthy epistemic negligence  
 
In this section I argue that Fricker’s focus on transactional identity bias as the 
source of harm allows for a separation of blame and wrongdoing via her account 
of innocent epistemic negligence. Although the concept reflects a common 
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intuition considering the difficulty of tracking the effects of epistemic injustice, I 
argue it leads to the displacement of responsibility to engage in epistemic labor, 
and risks obscuring significant harms. The displacement of a supposedly shared 
obligation of equal epistemic labor allows for certain agents (with privileged 
epistemic standing) to abdicate responsibility in terms of the limits of their 
discourse in a way that disadvantaged agents cannot afford to do.  
 
Gaile Pohlhaus distinguishes between a knower’s situatedness and her 
interdependence as two ways in which the sociality of a knower is epistemically 
significant (Pohlhaus). According to this account, a tension emerges between a 
knower that is situated “insofar as the knower’s social position draws her 
attention to particular aspects of the world” and the interdependent knower that 
makes sense of the world via shared epistemic resources. While this tension 
drives the knower to expand her knowledge, Pohlhaus argues it also serves as 
the source of a kind of epistemic injustice overlooked by Fricker’s account: willful 
hermeneutical ignorance (Pohlhaus, p716). Willful hermeneutical ignorance 
describes the injustice that results when knowers who are at the margins of social 
power take on the epistemic labor to resist domination, or ensure an equal 
burden of epistemic labor. This task is taken on as a community by producing 
epistemic resources to account for their experiences while dominantly situated 
knowers ignore the ways in which their subjectivity is interdependent with the 
marginalized knowers and “continue to misunderstand and misinterpret the 
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world” [8 p716]. Additionally, because epistemic resources are developed 
collectively, and (importantly) interdependently, the expectation, or the ideal in 
this situation is that we (equally as knowers) need one another in order to make 
use of them. Because producing knowledge is a shared labor, a refusal to develop 
or acknowledge epistemic resources contributes to epistemic injustice (mainly 
hermeneutical injustice) in that it rests the burden solely on a subset of knowers 
and “maintains ignorance about whole parts of the world” (Pohlhaus).  
Pohlhaus’s dialectical tension lends support to the possibility that conceiving 
epistemic negligence as innocent and unavoidable risks an instance in which a 
speaker is taken advantage of by the hearer’s reluctance to engage this 
intersubjective and interdependent position in assessing the speaker’s credibility.  
The concept of innocent negligence obscures the relevance of hermeneutical 
injustice at the level of an individual transaction. This harm is described as a 
distinctly epistemic kind of exploitation.  
 
Another contribution to our concept of epistemic labor entails 
understanding how strategic refusals to not understand are enabled by 
derivatization as an aspect of credibility downgrading. This, in simple terms, 
refers to the ways in which one’s credibility is made derivative, or secondary, to 
the commitments and views of the hearer. Pohlhaus presents a case of epistemic 
exploitation that accounts for selective downgrading of an individual’s credibility. 
Although Fricker acknowledges that a hearer may reasonably be attuned only to 
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that which interests him, Pohlhaus elevates the intricacies at play when a speaker 
offers their testimony. Particularly, derivatization does not consist of 
downgrading everything that the speaker offers as testimony but the hearer, 
rather, selectively chooses which claims to affirm or deny merely on the basis of 
“how well they confirm to the hearer’s existing doxastic commitments” 
(Congdon, p10)(Pohlhaus). In this way the speaker is harmed to the extent that 
their subjectivity is made derivative of the hearer’s experiences. The emphasis 
here is the work employed in maintaining one’s ignorance regardless of being 
offered appropriate epistemic resources as evidence. Importantly, refusal to 
engage in epistemic labor in this instance requires the hearer to actively construct 
a narrative “on which dismissing these resources without considering them is 
reasonable” (Pohlhaus). While derivatization in this example is portrayed at the 
individual level, the point that an individual does not merely fail to uptake the 
appropriate resources, but also positively constructs alternative narratives that 
shape our collective epistemic resources has implications for understanding 
hermeneutical injustice beyond the individual transaction. Additionally, 
derivatization involves alienating the speaker to the extent that she is only able to 
make her experiences intelligible on another’s terms.  
 
Finally, the account developed by Nora Berenstain draws our attention to 
instances in which privileged individuals fail to recognize the work that 
marginalized persons undertake in educating them about their lived experiences. 
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Berenstain advances the claim that such unrecognized, uncompensated, and 
coerced epistemic labor is what constitutes epistemic exploitation. In 
characterizing this labor, she explains that a primary challenge for marginalized 
individuals offering their testimony is default skepticism marked by a privileged 
individual’s ability to set the terms of the debate. Key to this account of epistemic 
labor is that the privileged person wrongly positions themselves as an epistemic 
peer with the marginalized person in order to pose skepticism as a substantive 
objection (Berenstain). Berenstain brings our attention to disagreements in a 
debate setting. She draws from debate norms to show how different responses 
are expected when faced with a substantive objection compared to an objection 
based on misunderstanding. She explains that when we are interacting in such 
debate “an objection that is based on a misunderstanding does not call for a 
substantive response”, and instead of burdening the speaker “with the task of 
responding to such an objection, we recognize that it is the job of the confused 
objector (hearer) to do the work” necessary to understand the speaker’s account 
and recognize how their objection was misguided (Berenstain, p.7). Ultimately, 
the key feature is the disproportionate labor; the burden of proof rests on the 
marginalized speaker to ensure the transaction’s shared understanding. Similar 
to our last account of epistemic labor, Berenstain’s explanation illustrates critical 
aspects of epistemic injustice at the transactional level. However, by pointing to 
the intricacies of this labor we may better recognize injustice that extends beyond 
23 
 
that which is motivated by identity prejudice in the production and sharing of 
epistemic resources the structural level. 
 
Similar to willful hermeneutic ignorance, a final refusal to engage in 
epistemic labor is exemplified through Medina’s contextualist approach. He calls 
attention to “active ignorance” as epistemic laziness, that is produced and 
sustained by epistemic habits that protect established cultural expectations. The 
effect of active ignorance is that a group becomes “relatively blind and deaf to 
those things that seem to defy those expectations” and such cultural expectations 
produce a “strong form of epistemic laziness that blocks evidentiary 
explorations” (Medina, p.26). This active ignorance, characterized by a lack of 
“motivation and intellectual curiosity to probe the evidence more fully”, Medina 
claims, constitutes an epistemic obstacle in the pursuit of knowledge that leads to 
epistemic injustice. 
 
Epistemic labor is difficult to engage in even if one is aware of its primacy for 
epistemic justice. Consequently, it is difficult to track at a systemic level. While 
we, as individuals, may only be able to remind individuals to act in certain ways 
by taking up certain virtues, systems and institutions have an obligation to 
ensure equal distribution of epistemic labor in order to ensure an epistemically 
just system.  I identify two ways that this can be applied to the healthcare system 
as a social institution. First, it assessing epistemic justice in the planning stages 
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concerns setting research agendas that determine the kinds of illnesses and needs 
should be prioritized for the production of epistemic resources or funding pilot 
projects. Second, the way the healthcare system sets up epistemic labor, such as 
the training of health professionals, support given to patients to better navigate 
their care, and efforts to establish a system of feedback, is especially important 
considering the anticipation of significant differences in epistemic standing. The 
implications of equal distribution of epistemic labor for clinical practice includes 
disclosure requirements in informed consent, diagnosis, and redefining certain 
illnesses. Recent work by various theorists specifically focus on evaluations of 
well-being for stigmatized patients, including those suffering from mental illness 
and chronic pain.  
 
VI. Epistemic labor accountability: a framework for ethical analysis 
 
Neglecting the proper attribution of epistemic authority in the production 
and sharing of epistemic resources risks perpetuating insidious harms. I suggest 
the concept of innocent epistemic negligence excuses such harms. The intuition of 
innocent epistemic negligence distorts the normative evaluation of instances in 
which one’s motives to engage or not in epistemic labor result in epistemic 





The previous sections show both that the risk for bias exists pervasively not 
only at the levels of individual interactions and institutional decision making, 
but also that epistemic labor accounts for the effects of bias in a context in which 
an instance of testimonial injustice necessarily involves hermeneutical injustice. 
Thus, a method that tracks our efforts to counter a variety of biases threatening 
an instance of epistemic injustice should strive to keep individuals accountable 
for engaging in epistemic labor that results in a just evaluation of credibility. 
 
I propose epistemic labor accountability as a framework to evaluate 
deliberations for epistemic injustice. This framework entails a commitment to 
transparency of the biases, and accountability to engage in the appropriate 
epistemic labor to manage it. Additionally, epistemic labor accountability can 
serve as a reminder of a consciousness shift, resulting from the development of 
the terminology of epistemic injustice in addition to its specific application to the 
healthcare setting. Making this shift known also serves to counter inclinations 
that seek comfort in the idea of a blameless, and innocent, epistemic negligence. 
This works both as a way to focus on the work of epistemic justice, but also to 
ensure the most is done to prevent injustice, to ensure an equal burden of 
epistemic labor.  
 
As a framework for bioethical analysis, epistemic labor accountability seeks 
to ensure an epistemically just health system. While the primary locus for this 
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work is in the epistemic labor that healthcare providers take on to ensure 
epistemically just treatment of their patients, a significant component of this 
framework is to evaluate the ways in which equal epistemic labor is tracked and 
enforced at the system level. Thus, instead of providing an account of various 
ways health personnel can be trained to better check their cognitive biases, I offer 
examples of how this framework can guide systems to prevent unequal burdens 
of epistemic labor.  
In particular, it aims to ensure that: biases are transparent in the presentation 
and assessment of evidence; implicit values are made explicit in the deliberation 
of reasons; benefits from institutional or individual commitments are identified, 
the recognition of gaps in epistemic resources that are operative in a discussion is 
prioritized; prevents perpetuating existing historical epistemic injustice by 
evaluating long-term effects of a decision on the production and distribution of 
epistemic resources. Additionally, this framework for bioethical analysis has 
implications for shared decision making processes, integrating consideration of 
ethical issues within a context of conflicting values, and approaches to 
procedural fairness, in terms of the kinds of evidence that are relevant for 






VII. Case study: Disclosure requirements in the clinical encounter: 
 
Within the discussions of a clinical encounter, valid informed consent 
requires disclosure of the nature of the medical procedure, the risks, benefits, and 
potential alternatives that a reasonable patient would find necessary. 
Importantly, judgments vacillating between giving decisional authority to the 
patient while maintaining the authority of the physician are rooted in the 
uncertainty of medical practice. In order to determine the requirements for 
disclosure for valid informed consent the “reasonable patient standard” and 
similarly “reasonable subject standard” are used in the clinical and research 
contexts respectively (Katz). One challenge with the use of standards for such a 
complex dialogue is the ambiguity surrounding the shared decision making 
process. While it is unclear whether using the reasonable patient standard 
succeeds in ensuring a more just interaction or serves as another method of 
mitigating liability, evaluating its use with a framework of epistemic labor 
accountability clarifies the obligations to avoid epistemic injustice. In particular, 
if we construe the reasonable patient standard relative to the ability of a 
particular health system, hospital, or clinic to learn and capture a broader 
spectrum of their patients’ experiences and needs, we might be better equipped 
to foster the necessary spaces and interactions suited for an epistemically just 




The case of two patients with similar symptoms of coronary artery disease 
exemplifies how evaluating for epistemic labor accountability can serve to ensure 
a more just deliberation. When the first patient, a very well informed executive, 
is advised stent implantation as treatment that entails inserting a device to 
prevent blockages in one’s artery, he consulted his phone, asked for alternatives 
and sought the advice of several specialists. The cardiologist he sought out 
researched comparisons of stent implantation with more alternative treatments, 
and interestingly, concluded that stents for stable patients such as the executive, 
did not prevent a single heart attacks nor did it extend the lives of patients. The 
second patient did not question his doctor, and accepted the stent implantation 
for his symptoms although these were due to a previous lymphoma treatment. 
The second patient died because he could not go off the medication for his stent 
implantation and as a result did not survive waiting for an operation (these cases 
were presented in a report on medical evidence and treatment decisions) 
[Epstein]. These cases show the difficulty of discussing risks of treatment, and 
especially highlight hermeneutical injustices in the diagnosing cardiologist’s 
limited knowledge of the risk of stent complications as well as the second 
patient’s lack of epistemic resources when compared to the executive to ask the 
right questions in the clinical encounter. In addition, this lack of epistemic 
resources is evident in the credibility excess the second patient attributes to his 
diagnosis. While efforts for patient decision tools and shared decision making 
aim for a more just interaction, assessing epistemic labor accountability places 
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obligations on the healthcare system to provide patients with the epistemic 
resources necessary to hold their doctor’s accountable for relevant biases. 
So, we should help patients not only make decisions on their own, once the 
doctor has given them data, but to hold doctors epistemically accountable for the 
values that go into the entire decision making processes. Importantly, more 
tangible obstacles to epistemic labor accountability include biases that result 
from factors such as urgency stemming from limited time per patient visits and 
heavy pharmaceutical investment in certain treatments. In this way, the 
epistemic labor accountability seeks more intentional interactions, curtailing 
credibility excess and deficits, and ensuring that healthcare system has invested 
itself into determining the kind of information that patients would need to have 




Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice provides a useful starting point to 
discern the harms that result when a speaker’s credibility is wrongly 
downgraded. However, in so far as it considers instances of wrongful credibility 
downgrading either unjust if it were caused by some identity-prejudice, or else 
instances of innocent epistemic negligence, it overlooks crucial aspects of the 
ways in which knowers relate to each other. Additionally, the concept of 
innocent epistemic negligence seems to obscure a pervasive risk of bias 
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embedded in our epistemic practices, when we trace the harm of injustice from 
the transactional to an institutional level. This leads to a displacement of 
responsibility for the shared project of attaining an epistemically just society. By 
adopting a comprehensive understanding of the way bias operates in individual 
judgments and decision making processes, we gain an understanding of 
underlying processes required to ensure an epistemically just transaction, and of 
the extent to which our ability to get things right about the world depends on our 
capacity for epistemic justice. A lens of epistemic labor accountability helps 
guide our efforts in appropriately assessing epistemic merit and attributing 
epistemic authority, including a commitment to be transparent about biases and 
keeping other individuals and institutions accountable. Finally, the framework 
reveals distinct obligations for assessment at the institutional or systemic level. 
Although epistemic labor accountability would help to ensure public trust in 
public health and clinical practices, it is important to recognize that instances of 
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